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One Bite at the Apple: Reversals of Convictions Tainted by
Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Ban on
Double Jeopardy
Rick A. Bierschbach
INTRODUCTION

In a Pennsylvania community, a middle-aged schoolteacher is
found dead in the trunk of a car. A massive investigation ensues
and results in the indictment of a single defendant for first-degree
murder. No evidence exists that directly implicates the defendant
in the killings, and he adamantly professes his innocence from the
outset. The prosecutor is convinced that the defendant is guilty but
is frustrated by the lack of direct evidence and fears that he will not
be able to secure a conviction at trial. He negotiates with a key
prosecution witness to deliver damaging false testimony against the
defendant and with a detective to "discover" evidence linking the
defendant to the crime scene, At trial, the defendant - repeatedly
contesting the truthfulness of the prosecution's case - is convicted
and subsequently sentenced to life in prison.
While preparing for appeal, the defense counsel discovers the
prosecutor's misconduct. The appellate court reverses the conviction because of the misconduct and finds that without the fabricated
evidence there would have been insufficient evidence to convict.
Nevertheless, the Government initiates a new trial on the same
charges. The defendant then moves to bar the retrial under the
Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause to avoid the ordeal of a second trial.1
Given the uncertain relationship between prosecutorial misconduct and the Double Jeopardy Clause, whether a court would grant
the defendant's motion is unclear. Under the long-established rule
of United States v. Ball,2 the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar
the retrial of a defendant whose conviction simply has been reversed on appeal.3 Burks v. United States4 established the only existing exception to Ball when it forbade retrial after the reversal of
a conviction on grounds of insufficient evidence.5 But the Supreme
1. The Double Jeopardy Clause states: "No person shall •.. be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The facts of this hypothetical case are based roughly on those of Commonwealth v. Smith,
615 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1992).
2. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
3. See 163 U.S. at 672.
4. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
5. See 437 U.S. at 18.
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Court also has recognized, albeit in the context of mistrials, that
particularly egregious prosecutorial misconduct can and should trigger the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause. In Oregon v.
Kennedy,6 the Court held that double jeopardy prohibits retrial
when a defendant successfully moves for a mistrial on the basis of
prosecutorial misconduct intended to goad him into requesting the
mistrial.7 When prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of evidence provides the basis for an appellate reversal, however, double
jeopardy jurisprudence remains undeveloped.s
This Note argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial
after reversals of convictions tainted by prosecutorial misconduct in
the submission of evidence when two conditions are met: (1) the
prosecutor intentionally introduced tainted evidence,9 and (2) excluding the tainted evidence would have left insufficient evidence at
trial to support the defendant's conviction. This Note contends that
this limited extension of double jeopardy protection is both mandated by the policies underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause and
consistent with existing double jeopardy jurisprudence.
Part I identifies the competing interests that the Court attempts
to balance whenever a defendant invokes the double jeopardy ban
on successive prosecutions. Part II examines the balance of inter6. 456 U.S. 667 {1982).
7. See 456 U.S. at 679.
8. Uncertainty among courts of appeals regarding the application of double jeopardy
analysis to reversals tainted by prosecutorial misconduct has grown steadily since the
Kennedy decision. The Second Circuit, for instance, twice has suggested strongly that Kennedy's rationale should preclude retrial after reversal in cases in which a prosecutor anticipates an acquittal and avoids it by a deliberate act of misconduct at trial. See United States v.
Pavloyianis, 996 F.2d 1467, 1474-75 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912,
916 (2d Cir. 1992). The Eighth Circuit noted in Palmer v. Clarke; 961 F.2d 771 (8th Cir.
1992), that the Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence suggests that retrial after reversals of
convictions secured in part by prosecutorial misconduct might be barred in certain instances.
See 961 F.2d at 775. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit recognized early on that the principle of
Kennedy could be applied to "bar retrial where the [misconduct] caused a tainted verdict to
be set aside, rather than a tainted proceeding to be aborted." Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d
298, 307 (5th Cir. 1982). These positions are apparently contrary to those of the Seventh and
Fourth Circuits, both of which have found that a defendant who did not move for a mistrial
on the basis of intentional prosecutorial misconduct cannot claim a double jeopardy bar to
retrial after his conviction is reversed on that ground. See Beringer v. Sheahan, 934 F.2d 110,
114 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1006 (1991); United States v. Head, 697 F.2d 1200, 1206
{4th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 {1982). In Jacob v. Clarke, 52 F.3d 178 {8th Cir. 1995),
the Eighth Circuit recognized this apparent circuit split as it again noted but skirted the issue
of whether the Kennedy principle should extend to reversals tainted by prosecutorial misconduct. See 52 F.3d at 182 ("[W]e need not dissect [the defendant's] ... legal theory to see if
any part would state a claim under the Second Circuit's decision in Wallach. We leave for
another day whether this court will follow Wallach, or the Seventh Circuit's seemingly contrary rule.").
9. As used in this Note, "tainted evidence" refers to any evidence that the prosecutor
knows is inadmissible at trial. The term thus includes· both falsified evidence, such as perjured testimony and fabricated test results, and nonfalsified evidence that is clearly inadmissible in a criminal proceeding, such as evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and
seizure.
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ests in two lines of double jeopardy cases - those dealing with reversals of convictions and those dealing with mistrials tainted by
prosecutorial misconduct - and concludes that when the event
triggering a retrial cannot be characterized as a procedural error,
the defendant's double jeopardy interests generally outweigh those
of the state. Part III argues that in cases of reversals based on intentional prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of evidence,
double jeopardy should bar retrial if insufficient evidence exists to
sustain the conviction in the absence of the tainted evidence.
I.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY INTERESTS

The fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause
is that the State should not be able to oppress individuals through

abuse of the criminal process.10 No single principle, however, determines when the reprosecutiori. of a defendant is oppressive for
purposes of double jeopardy. Rather, defining that point involves
balancing the competing rights and interests of both individuals and
society.11 This Part identifies and examines the interests contemplated by the double jeopardy ban on successive prosecutions. Section I.A defines the protected interests of the accused. Section I.B
defines the interests of society against which the rights of the accused are balanced.
A.

The Interests of Defendants

The Court traditionally has viewed the Double Jeopardy Clause
as safeguarding three interests of defendants: the interest in being
free from successive prosecutions, the interest in the finality of
10. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 42 (1988) (acknowledging that the Double
Jeopardy Clause aims to prevent governmental oppression); United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) ("At the heart of [the double jeopardy] policy is the
concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second trial for the
same offense would arm Government with a potent instrument of oppression."); Charles L.
Cantrell, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Punishment: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 24 S. TEX. L.J. 735, 771 (1983) (characterizing the Double Jeopardy Clause as a "shield
against governmental tyranny"); Monroe G. McKay, Double Jeopardy: Are the Pieces the
Puzzle?, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 18 (1983) ("[W]e can identify at least one core value [of the
Double Jeopardy Clause] - protection of the individual from the government's use of the
criminal justice system to harass and oppress."); James F. Ponsoldt, When Guilt Should Be

Irrelevant: Government Overreaching as a Bar to Reprosecution Under the Double Jeopardy
Clause After Oregon v. Kennedy, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 76, 87 (1983) ("[Protection of] citizens
from governmental abuses of power ... is .•• the fundamental principle underlying the
mandatory language of the double jeopardy clause."); George C. Thomas III, The Prohibi·
tion of Successive Prosecutions for the Same Offense: In Search of a Definition, 71 IOWA L.
REv. 323, 325 (1986) ("In the United States, virtually everyone agrees that [the double jeopardy] prohibition is an essential part of an individual's protection against governmental
tyranny.").
11. Of course, this is not to say that the interests of defendants and of society are diamet·
rically opposed. At the broadest level, society undoubtedly has a significant interest in ensuring that the individual rights and interests of defendants are respected.
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judgments, and the interest in having the trial completed in front of
the first tribunal. This section examines each interest in turn.
The most basic interest protected by the Double Jeopardy
Clause is the defendant's interest in being free from the consequences of successive prosecutions.12 Green v. United States13 best
articulates the fundamental policy underlying this interest:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty.14

The accused has a fundamental interest in restricting the Government to a single attempt to prove his guilt at trial for two main
reasons. First, multiple attempts by the Government to prove guilt
seriously disrupt a defendant's personal life during trialls and thus
provide a vehicle for severe governmental harassment of the defendant.16 Second, repeated prosecutions increase the risk of an
unjust conviction of an innocent defendant by wearing down the
defendant and giving the Government new opportunities to learn
from its earlier mistakes and to hone its trial strategies.17
12. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 132 (1980); Manin Linen Supply Co.,
430 U.S. at 569; United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 346 (1975) (characterizing the prohibition against multiple trials as "the controlling constitutional principle" of double jeopardy).
13. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
14. 355 U.S. at 187-88.
15. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-04 (1978) ("[A] second prosecution
may be grossly unfair. It increases the financial and emotional burden on the accused [and]
prolongs the period in which he is stigmatized by an unresolved accusation of wrongdoing
...."); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 608 (1976) (noting that the Double Jeopardy
Clause protects a defendant against the "anxiety, expense, and delay occasioned by multiple
prosecutions"); see also WAYNER. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 25.l(b) (2d ed. 1992) (noting the burdens placed on defendants by successive prosecutions).
16. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 470 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (" 'Harassment of an accused by successive prosecutions ... [is an example of when] jeopardy attaches.'" (quoting Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963))); Gori v. United
States, 367 U.S. 364, 369 (1961) (noting that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to cases in
which the defendant would be "harassed by successive, oppressive prosecutions").
17. See United States v. Difrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980) ("[I]f the Government
may reprosecute, it gains an advantage from what it learns at the first trial about the
strengths of the defense case and the weaknesses of its own."); Arizona v. Washington, 434
U.S. at 503-04 ("[A] second prosecution may ... enhance the risk that an innocent defendant
may be convicted.").
Judge Leventhal's description of the evolution of the government's case in Carsey v.
United States, 392 F2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1967), provides a good illustration of how successive
prosecutions may enhance the possibility of a defendant's conviction:
[T]he Government witnesses came to drop from their testimony impressions favorable
to the defendant. Thus a key prosecution witness, the last person to see appellant and
the deceased together, who began by testifying that they had acted that evening like
newlyweds on a honeymoon, without an unfriendly word spoken, ended up by saying for
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Growing out of a defendant's interest in facing only one prosecution for an alleged offense is his interest in the finality of judgments.18 Protection of the finality of judgments recognizes the
value of the repose that attaches to the entry of a conclusive verdict, whether in favor of or against a defendant.19 Thus, a verdict of
acquittal represents a final judgment that frees the defendant from
the specter of future prosecution.20 In short, finality contemplates
"the importance to the defendant of being able, once and for all, to
conclude his confrontation with society."21 In doing so, it seeks to
define those instances in which retrial of a defendant constitutes the
sort of oppressive governmental action that the Double Jeopardy
Clause is intended to prevent.22
the first time in four trials that the words between them had been 'firm,' and possibly
harsh and 'cross.' We also note that the police officer who readily acquiesced in the two
'hung jury' trials that appellant was 'hysterical' later withheld that characterization. This
shift, though less dramatic, was by no means inconsequential in view of the significance
of appellant's condition at the time he made a statement inconsistent with what he later
told another officer.
392 F.2d at 813-14 (footnote omitted).
18. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 681-82 (1982) {"The Double Jeopardy Clause
represents a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's benefit in criminal proceedings.'') {Stevens, J., concurring); see also DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 128 (recognizing that the
Double Jeopardy Clause aims to preserve the finality and integrity of judgments); Arizona v.
Washington, 434 U.S. at 503 ("If the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final
judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair.");
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971); Anne Bowen Poulin, The Limits of Double
Jeopardy: A Course Into the Dark?, 39 VILI.. L. REv. 627, 639 (1994) ("The original purpose
of the double jeopardy protection and its predecessors was to preserve the finality of
judgments.").
The notion of finality often is referred to as the primary interest protected by the Double
Jeopardy Clause. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978) ("[T]he primary purpose
of the Double Jeopardy Clause [is] to protect the integrity of a final judgment.''); Crist v.
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978) (noting that a primary purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause
is "to preserve the finality of judgments").
19. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 15, § 25.l(b) (discussing the "entitlement to a
sense of repose" protected by finality); Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy:
Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1051
{1980) ("The [finality] interest is easy to articulate: it is a need for 'repose,' a desire to know
the exact extent of one's liability, an interest in knowing 'once and for all' how many years
one will have to spend in prison.'' (quoting Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 810 {1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); and Jorn, 400 U.S. at 486)).
20. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 682 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Sanabria v. United
States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978) (holding that an erroneous acquittal constitutes a final, unreviewable judgment); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) {holding that an acquittal
that a judge improperly directed was final even though "based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation").
21. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 486.
22. See LAFAVE & lsRAEL, supra note 15, § 25.l(b) ("Finality ..• looks ••. to the concerns of protecting the defendant against prosecution oppression. • . . [T]he adverse consequences of ••. governmental oppression .•. are checked in several different ways by a double
jeopardy clause aimed at preserving the 'finality' or 'integrity' of final judgments.''); George
C. Thomas III, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 827, 840 {"The
potential for government oppression of individuals by multiple use of the criminal process •••
makes applying the finality principle to the process peculiarly appropriate. . • • The underly-
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Related to but separate from a defendant's interest in the finality of judgments is his interest in his first tribunal.23 This interest
encompasses a defendant's right to have his guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empaneled to try
him. 24 Tue right stems from the Court's early recognition that if the
Government simply could abort any proceeding that it perceived as
going poorly, the defendant's protected interest in the finality of a
verdict would be little more than a "hollow shell."25 Pre-verdict
trial terminations deprive a defendant of the "option to go to the
first jury and, perhaps, end the dispute then and there with an acquittal."26 In doing so, they deprive the defendant of the repose
that would have attached had the trial been allowed to run its
course. Tue defendant's interest in a particular tribunal thus supplements his core interest in final judgments by protecting him
against governmental manipulation of process designed to prevent
the initial fact finder from reaching a verdict in the defendant's
case.27
ing goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the
initial proceeding."). Consider also the statement of the Court in United States v. Jorn:
A power in government to subject the individual to repeated prosecutions for the same
offense would cut deeply into the framework of procedural protections which the Constitution establishes for the conduct of a criminal trial. And society's awareness of the
heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is
manifested in the willingness to limit the Government to a single criminal proceeding to
vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws.
Jorn, 400 U.S. at 479.
23. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 36 (1978) (recognizing the defendant's "valued right to
have his trial completed by a particular tribunal"); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497. 503
(1978); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973); Jorn, 400 U.S. at 484; Wade v. Hunter,
336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
24. See, e.g., Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673 ("[O]ne of the principal threads making up the
protection embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause is the right of the defendant to have his
trial completed before the first jury empaneled to try him."); Somerville, 410 U.S. at 471.
25. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673; see also Wade, 336 U.S. at 688 ("Past cases have decided
that a defendant ... may be subjected to the kind of 'jeopardy' that bars a second trial for the
same offense even though his trial is discontinued without a verdict." (citing Kepner v.
United States, 195 U.S. 100, 128 (1904))).
26. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 484; see also Poulin, supra note 18, at 634-35 ("An acquittal absolutely eliminates [the possibility of retrial]. Therefore, the government may manipulate the
first trial to avoid a probable verdict of acquittal and keep open the option of retrying the
defendant.").
27. As LaFave and Israel state:
[T]he Supreme Court recognized at an early point that the protection of verdict finality
could be subverted by actions that terminated a trial prior to verdict and thereby took
away from the defendant his opportunity to gain an acquittal. If such actions invariably
allowed the prosecution to retry the defendant, the finality of a likely acquittal could be
avoided and the prosecution could be given the opportunity to regroup and try again by
simply not allowing the trial to proceed to verdict. • • . Implicit in this protection is the
recognition ••. that there must be a barrier to prosecution manipulation of a trial termination to give it another chance . • . . [This] protection ... was designed basically as a
supplement to the core interest in preserving the integrity of judgments ..•.
LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 15, § 25.l(b); see also Peter Westen & Richard Drube!, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. Cr. REv. 81, 90 (characterizing "the
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The Interests of Society

The defendant's interests protected by the Double Jeopardy
Clause are not absolute.28 Balanced against those interests is the
state's need for effective enforcement of its criminal laws.29 As the
Court has recognized repeatedly, that need is satisfied by guaranteeing to society the right to one full and fair opportunity to prove a
defendant's guilt.30 When circumstances at trial have denied socidefendant's interest in retaining the particular tribunal with which he began" as part of his
"larger interest in finality").
28. A defendant's interest in the finality of an acquittal is the sole exception to this statement. When "the innocence of the accused has been confinned by a final judgment, the
Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair." Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978). This presumption of unfairness extends to all dispositions
that amount to acquittals, even those that are manifestly erroneous:
[I]t is well-established that terminations deemed 'acquittals' cannot be appealed by the
government. This rule applies to implied acquittals; to acquittals by the judge as trier of
fact; and to a trial judge's judgment of acquittal in the face of a deadlocked jury. The
rule holds even when an acquittal is due to trial court errors of law.
OFFICE OF LEGAL PouCY, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO nm ATTORNEY GENERAL ON
DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND GOVERNMENT APPEALS OF ACQUrITALS 41 (1987) (citations omitted); see also supra note 20. The absolute protection afforded a defendant's interest in the
finality of an acquittal is a consequence of "society's 'fundamental value determination ...
that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.'" Donald Eric
Burton, Note, A Closer Look at the Supreme Court and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 799, 814 (1988) (quoting In re Wmship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970)). Such absolute
protection has caused both the Court and commentators to characterize acquittals as carrying
special weight in the double jeopardy analysis. See, e.g., United States v. DiFrancesco, 449
U.S. 117, 129 (1980) ("An acquittal is accorded special weight."); Westen & Drube!, supra
note 27, at 123 (noting the "particular significance" that the law attaches to an acquittal).
29. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988) (reaffinning the notion that the
accused's interest in a fair trial must be balanced against society's interest in "punishing one
whose guilt is clear" (quoting United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964))); Garrett v.
United States, 471 U.S. 773, 796 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Decisions by this Court
have consistently recognized that the finality guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clause is
not absolute, but instead must accommodate the societal interest in prosecuting and convicting those who violate the law."); Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984) ("'[A]
defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some
instances be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.'" (quoting Wade, 336 U.S. at 689)); see also Poulin, supra note 18, at 663-64 (noting
that the "threat to the defendant's double jeopardy interests must be balanced against the
public interest in full and fair prosecution"); Westen & Drube!, supra note 27, at 103 (stating
that in each double jeopardy case involving successive prosecutions, "one must balance the
defendant's interest in finality against 'the public interest in assuring that each defendant
shall be subject to a just judgment on the merits of his case'" (quoting United States v. Scott,
437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978))).
This balancing approach often has been criticized by commentators. See, e.g., Thomas,
supra note 22, at 832 (rejecting the notion that each species of double jeopardy cases requires
a balancing of the defendant's interests against the government's interest in prosecuting
crime); Sarah 0. Wang, Note, Insufficient Attention to Insufficient Evidence: Some Double
Jeopardy Implications, 19 VA. L. REv. 1381, 1401 & n.130 {1993) ("[T]he Court's balancing
approach has been criticized as uncertain and erratic . • • • Such an approach allows judges
almost unlimited discretion in weighing the scales and determining the outcome.").
30. See, e.g., Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 682 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The
defendant's interest in finality .•. must be balanced against society's interest in affording the
prosecutor one full and fair opportunity to present his evidence to the jury."); Arizona v.
Washington, 434 U.S. at 505 ("[The defendant's] valued right to have the trial concluded by a
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ety that right, the need of society to vindicate its laws usually will
outweigh the double jeopardy interests of a defendant.31 Justice
H,arlan stated the rationale underlying this balancing approach and
its centrality to the Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence in United
States v. Jorn:32
Certainly it is clear beyond question that the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not guarantee a defendant that the Government will be prepared, in all circumstances, to vindicate the societal interest in law
enforcement through the vehicle of a single proceeding for a given
offense. Thus, for example, reprosecution for the same offense is permitted where the defendant wins a reversal on appeal of a conviction.
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) .... The determination to
allow reprosecution in these circumstances reflects the judgment that
the defendant's double jeopardy interests, however defined, do not go
so far as to compel society to so mobilize its decisionmaking resources
that it will be prepared to assure the defendant a single proceeding
free from harmful governmental or judicial error.33

The State's right to a complete and error-free prosecution thus
defines the boundaries of the defendant's interests. Although a defendant is guaranteed freedom from prosecution after the completion of a single error-free proceeding, he is not guaranteed such a
proceeding in the first instance.34 Indeed, when trial error deprives
society of its right to attempt to prove the defendant's guilt in a
single prosecution, well-accepted rules of double jeopardy dictate
that retrial is almost always permissible.35

particular tribunal is sometimes subordinate to the public interest in affording the prosecutor
one full and fair opportunity to present his evidence to an impartial jury.").
31. See infra notes 39-42, 56-62, 72-73 and accompanying text (describing instances in
which the Court has held that society's right to a full and fair opportunity to convict the
defendant outweighs the defendant's double jeopardy interests).
32. 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
33. 400 U.S. at 483-84.
34. See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988) ("It has long been settled ... that the
Double Jeopardy Clause's general prohibition against successive prosecutions does not prevent the government from retrying a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction
set aside ... because of some error in the proceedings leading to the conviction."); Kennedy,
456 U.S. at 685 ("A defendant cannot be guaranteed both that there will be only one proceeding and that it will be free of error."); Westen & Drubel, supra note 27, at 103 ("[l]f the
trial is tainted by an error ..• the defendant is not entitled to immunity from reprosecution,
whether he proceeds by requesting a mistrial or by requesting reversal of his conviction on
appeal, because immunity comes at 'too high a price' to society." (quoting Jorn, 400 U.S. at
480)).
35. For specific examples of such rules, see infra notes 39-42, 56-62 and accompanying
text.
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THE CURRENT DOUBLE JEOPARDY BALANCE: REVERSALS
OF CONVICTIONS AND MISTRIALS TAINTED BY
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

This Part examines two lines of double jeopardy cases: those
dealing with reversals of convictions on appeal and those dealing
with the effect of prosecutorial misconduct on the permissibility of
retrial after a mistrial. Section II.A discusses the rationale of the
appellate-reversal cases and contends that current double jeopardy
rules governing retrial after reversal fail to address the impact on
the double jeopardy balance of intentional prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of tainted evidence. Section II.B addresses
the rationale of the cases concerning mistrials tainted by
prosecutorial misconduct and concludes that the balance of double
jeopardy interests weighs strongly in favor of the defendant when a
mistrial is triggered by intentional prosecutorial manipulation of
double jeopardy rules.

A. Appellate Reversals of Convictions
This section examines the current double jeopardy rules governing the retrial of defendants whose convictions have been reversed on appeal. Section II.A.1 elucidates United States v.
Burks's36 exception to the traditional rule of United States v. Bat/31
and asserts that the exception contemplates situations in which a
defendant's double jeopardy interests are strong and society's interests fully have been served. Section II.A.2 examines the Court's
limitation of the Burks exception in Lockhart v. Nelson 38 and concludes that Lockhart leaves unanswered the question of how intentional prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of tainted
evidence affects the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to
convictions reversed on appeal.

1.

The Existing Exception to the Traditional Rule:
United States v. Burks

Ball established the basic rule that the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not bar the retrial of a defendant whose conviction is reversed
on appeal.39 The Ball rule is premised on the notion that society's
interest in a full and fair opportunity to convict trumps the interests
36.
37.
38.
39.

437 U.S. 1 (1978).
163 U.S. 662 (1896).
488 U.S. 33 (1988).
See Ball, 163 U.S. at 672.
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of defendants in cases of ordinary reversals for trial errors.4o Allowing a defendant to escape punishment by taking advantage of
ordinary trial errors would severely undermine that interest.41
Thus, the Court clearly has maintained that requiring a defendant
to stand trial a second time after a reversal based on trial error is
not the sort of governmental overreaching against which the
Double Jeopardy Clause is intended to protect.42
Burks established the only existing exception to the Ball rule in
holding that double jeopardy bars retrial when a defendant's conviction is reversed because the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict the defendant.43 A reversal on grounds of
evidentiary insufficiency, the Court pointed out, is the functional
equivalent of an acquittal at trial.44 The Double Jeopardy Clause
must extend to such functional acquittals - "[t]o hold otherwise
would create a purely arbitrary distinction" between defendants
based upon the hierarchical level of the judiciary at which a finding
of evidentiary insufficiency is made.45
40. United States v. Tateo lays out what the Court accepts as the most reasonable justification for the rule:
While different theories have been advanced to support the permissibility of retrial, of
greater importance than the conceptual abstractions employed to explain the Ball principle are the implications of that principle for the sound administration of justice. Corresponding to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial is the societal interest in
punishing one whose guilt is clear after he has obtained such a trial. It would be a high
price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment
because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading
to conviction.
United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 {1964); see also Justices of Boston Mun. Court v.
Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 308 (1984) (citing "fairness to society" and "lack of finality" as interests
supporting the Ball rule); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326 {1970) (noting that the Ball rule
pennits retrial of a defendant when "criminal proceedings against an accused have not run
their full course"); LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 15, § 25.4(a); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S.
519, 534 (1975) (noting that any exception to the constitutional protection against a second
trial "must be justified by interests of society").
41. Cf. Westen & Drube!, supra note 27, at 106 {"The essential teaching of United States
v. Ball is that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the State from retrying a defendant following an erroneous conviction. The defendant's interest in finality must yield to the
public interest in law enforcement." (footnotes omitted)).
42. See Ttbbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 40 {1982) ("[R]etrial after reversal of a conviction is
not the type of governmental oppression targeted by the Double Jeopardy Clause."); United
States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 131 (1980) (noting that reprosecution after a defendant's
successful appeal of his conviction is not an act of governmental oppression barred by double
jeopardy); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) ("[T]o require a criminal defendant
to stand trial again after he has successfully invoked a statutory right of appeal to upset his
first conviction is not an act of governmental oppression of the sort against which the Double
Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect.").
43. See United States v. Burks, 437 U.S. l, 18 (1978).
44. See 437 U.S. at 11; see also Thomas, supra note 22, at 856 (stating that Burks recognizes the equivalence of an appellate reversal for insufficient evidence with an acquittal at
trial); Wang, supra note 29, at 1386 {"The Burks Court explained that an appellate reversal
for insufficient evidence is the functional equivalent of an acquittal ....").
45. Burks, 437 U.S at 11; see also Thomas Collins, Note, Double Jeopardy: Evidentiary
Insufficiency v. Trial Error After Lockhart v. Nelson, 1989 DET. C.L. REv. 283, 295 (noting
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In reaching its holding, the Burks Court made an important distinction between the reversal of a conviction for trial error and the
reversal of a conviction for evidentiary insufficiency.46 A reversal
for trial error, because it "does not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case,"47 is not the
equivalent of an acquittal at trial. Rather, such a reversal is simply
"a determination that a defendant has been convicted through a
judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect."48
It is unclear whether the defendant would have been entitled to an
acquittal at trial had the error not occurred - in the absence of the
error, the State might well have taken some different course of action at trial that would have resulted in an equally effective case
against the defendant.49 Consequently, the defendant cannot claim
that retrial deprives him of the benefit of a valid verdict of acquittal.50 The State, on the other hand, can claim that the trial error
deprived it of a full and fair opportunity to prove the defendant's
guilt.51 Because of the strength of the State's interests in such cases,
retrial is permissible.52
that, for double jeopardy purposes, no logical difference exists between an appellate court's
finding of evidentiary insufficiency and an acquittal from a trial court).
46. See Burks, 437 U.S. at 13-16.
47. 437 U.S. at 15.
48. 437 U.S. at 15.
49. See Richard B. Lankford, Casenote, Double Jeopardy and Appellate Acquittal Based
on Insufficiency of Evidence: Thomas v. United States, an Unnecessarily Broad Calculus, 10
GEO. MAsoN U. L. REv. 559, 573-74 (1988) (noting that Burks is based on the notion that
"the government could have provided other evidence at trial if it had not relied on an erroneous evidentiary ruling from the bench"); id. at 571 (further noting that "[t]he government will
often have evidence on hand at trial which might have been used but for reliance on an
erroneous evidentiary ruling by the trial court that admitted other evidence").
50. Similarly, the defendant could not claim that he lost the full value of his initial tribunal because it is unclear whether that tribunal would have acquitted him in the absence of the
error. Although the defendant's interest in avoiding a second prosecution remains substantial, the Court repeatedly has made clear that those interests by themselves are not enough to
invoke a double jeopardy bar. When the defendant chooses to upset a verdict on appeal, he
also chooses to endure the second prosecution in order to afford society its one fair opportunity to convict. See supra note 30.
51. See Burks, 437 U.S. at 15 (stating that, when a conviction is reversed due to procedural error, "society maintains a valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished").
52. The Court has held that a similar balance of interests exists when a conviction is
reversed because it is against the weight of the evidence at trial. Under Tibbs v. Florida, a
reversal of a conviction because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, unlike a
reversal based on insufficient evidence, does not trigger a double jeopardy bar to retrial. See
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 47 (1982). This is because a reversal based on the weight of the
evidence "does not mean that acquittal was the only proper verdict." 457 U.S. at 42. Rather,
such a reversal reflects a belief by the appellate court that the jury improperly assessed questionable testimony at trial. See 457 U.S. at 42. At bottom, reversal of a conviction that was
against the weight of the evidence simply gives a defendant a second chance to prove his
innocence before a new fact finder. See 457 U.S. at 42-43. Just as it is in the interests of
justice to afford the defendant a second chance at an acquittal, it is also in the interests of
justice to afford the state its own chance to re-prove the defendant's guilt before the new
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In contrast, if a conviction is reversed due to insufficient evidence, the State "has been given one fair opportunity to offer
whatever proof it could assemble" and hence "cannot complain of
prejudice" upon being denied a retrial.S3 Because the defendant
was entitled to an acquittal at trial, he has a valid claim that retrial
would deprive him of the benefit of an acquittal and thus that his
double jeopardy interests should prevail over those of society. Barring retrial simply affords the defendant the double jeopardy protection to which he was entitled from the outset of the case.s4
Permitting retrial, on the other hand, affords the State a second full
and fair opportunity to convict the defendant, thereby implicating
the concerns of oppressive reprosecution that the Double Jeopardy
Clause seeks to avoid.ss
2.

The Limits of Burks: Erroneously Admitted Evidence and
Lockhart v. Nelson

The balance of double jeopardy interests is different in cases of
reversals of convictions due to erroneously admitted evidence. In
those cases, the Burks exception does not apply and retrial is permissible even if insufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction in
the absence of the erroneously admitted evidence. In Lockhart v.
jury. As Tibbs makes clear, the balance of double jeopardy interests in such a case is similar
to that in cases of reversal due to procedural error:
While an appellate ruling based on the weight of the evidence thus fails to implicate the
policies supporting Burks and Greene, it does involve the usual principles permitting
retrial after a defendant's successful appeal. Just as the Double Jeopardy Clause does
not require society to pay the high price of freeing every defendant whose first trial was
tainted by prosecutorial error, it should not exact the price of immunity for every defendant who persuades an appellate panel to overturn an error-free conviction and give
him a second chance at acquittal. Giving the defendant this second opportunity, when
the evidence is sufficient to support the first verdict, hardly amounts to "governmental
oppression of the sort against which the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to
protect."
457 U.S. at 44 (quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978)); see also Hudson v.
Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 45 n.5 (1981) (distinguishing reversals based on insufficient evidence
from those based on the weight of the evidence and noting that "nothing in Burks precludes
retrial" in cases of the latter).
53. Burks, 437 U.S. at 16 ("[I]t is difficult to conceive how society has any greater interest
in retrying a defendant when, on review, it is decided as a matter of law that the jury could
not properly have returned a verdict of guilty."),
54. See 437 U.S. at 16 (noting that "an appellate reversal means that the government's
case ... should not have even been submitted to the jury").
55. Justice White in Tibbs v. Florida concisely stated the distinction drawn by the Court in

Burks:
The relevant question is whether the reversal is " 'due to a failure of proof at trial' where
the State received a 'fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble.' " .•.
[T]he relevant distinction is between reversals based on evidentiary grounds and those
based on procedural grounds: Only in the latter case can the State proceed to retrial
without offending the deeply ingrained principle that "the State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense."
Tibbs, 451 U.S. at 50-51 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Nelson, 5 6 the Court held that an appellate court conducting a Burks
analysis must consider all of the evidence admitted by the trial
court, including that which was admitted erroneously.s1 Retrial is
not barred as long as the quantum of evidence admitted at trial was
sufficient to support a conviction, regardless of a finding that the
evidence would have been insufficient to support a conviction had
the erroneously admitted evidence been excluded.5 8
The Lockhart Court looked to the rationale of Burks in reaching its decision. The Court explicitly noted that reversal for the erroneous admission into evidence of a conviction that had been
commuted was "beyond dispute ... a situation described in Burks
as reversal for 'trial error' - the trial court erred in admitting a
particular piece of evidence, and without it there was insufficient
evidence to support a judgment of conviction."59 As in Burks, that
error did not necessarily entitle the defendant to a judgment of acquittal. This is because "the trial judge would presumably have allowed the prosecutor an opportunity to offer evidence" equivalent
to that which should have been excluded at trial. 60 In such a case,
society's interest in a full and fair opportunity to convict outweighs
the double jeopardy interests of the defendant.61 Like Burks,
Lockhart protects society's interest by characterizing a reversal for
the unintentional use of inadmissible evidence as "trial error" and
then recreating the situation that would have existed at trial had the
error not occurred.62
Lockhart provides little guidance, however, in cases of reversals
due to intentional prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of
tainted evidence. Lockhart dealt only with reversals triggered by
procedural evidentiary error. 63 It thus contemplates instances in
which a prosecutor did not intend deliberately to deceive the trial
court when introducing inadmissible evidence. 64 Indeed, the Court
56. 488 U.S. 33 (1988).
57. See 488 U.S. at 40-42.
58. See 488 U.S. at 40-42.
59. 488 U.S. at 40.
60. 488 U.S. at 42.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 28-35.
62. See Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 40-42, 42 ("Our holding today thus merely recreates the
situation that would have been obtained if the trial court had excluded the evidence of the
conviction because of the showing of a pardon.").
63. See 488 U.S. at 40 (treating the situation as a reversal for trial error); see also Collins,
supra note 45, at 283 ("[The Lockhart holding] was based on the majority opinion that the
admission of a pardoned conviction was mere trial error ..••").
64. Cf. William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. REV.
411, 482 {1993) (noting the importance for double jeopardy purposes of the difference between a case involving a procedural defect that would prevent the public from obtaining a
fair opportunity to convict and a case in which the prosecution is using the superior resources
of the state to harass or achieve a tactical advantage over the accused).
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itself recognized this important limitation on Lockhart when it
twice carefully distinguished the Lockhart scenario of erroneously
admitted evidence from scenarios involving deliberate prosecutorial
misconduct and noted that it had "no occasion to consider" instances of the latter.65 Thus, after Lockhart, the question of how
intentional prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of evidence
affects the application of double jeopardy to reversals of convictions remains unanswered.
B. Mistrials Tainted by Prosecutorial Misconduct
Though unfortunate, Lockhart's failure to address the problem
of intentional prosecutorial misconduct does not mean that analysis
of the impact of such misconduct on appellate reversals of convictions must proceed without guidance from the Court. The Court's
mistrial cases provide an appropriate starting point for such an
analysis, for it is in the context of mistrials that the interplay between intentional prosecutorial misconduct and double jeopardy is
most fully developed. 66 This section briefly discusses the Court's
treatment of prosecutorial misconduct in the context of mistrials.
Section II.B.1 examines the traditional rules governing the retrial of
a defendant whose initial trial ends in a mistrial. Section II.B.2 explores the rationale of Oregon v. Kennedy 67 and asserts that
Kennedy recognizes the necessity of protecting a defendant's
double jeopardy interests from subversion by intentional
prosecutorial misconduct at trial.

1. Traditional Double Jeopardy Rules in the Context of Mistrials
Two fundamental rules traditionally governed double jeopardy
protection in the mistrial context. First was the "manifest-necessity
rule": in the absence of manifest necessity for the declaration of a
mistrial, the State could not retry a defendant following a mistrial
declared without the defendant's consent.68 By preventing the
65. See Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 36 n.2. The Court pointedly noted at the outset of its opinion that "[n]othing in the record suggests any misconduct in the prosecutor's submission of
the [erroneously admitted] evidence." 488 U.S. at 34. It then went on to state: "There is no
indication that the prosecutor knew of the pardon and was attempting to deceive the court.
We therefore have no occasion to consider what the result would be if the case were otherwise." 488 U.S. at 36 n.2; see also United States v. Quinn, 901 F.2d 522, 531 (6th Cir. 1990)
(noting the Lockhart Court's emphasis on the lack of prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of evidence).
66. See Ponsoldt, supra note 10, at 94-97 (surveying the development of the Court's treatment of prosecutorial misconduct in double jeopardy mistrial cases); Westen & Drube!, supra
note 27, at 85 ("[T]he Court has had more experience [with the problems of reprosecution
following mistrial] and its analysis of this aspect of double jeopardy is more mature.").
67. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
68. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978) ("The prosecutor must demonstrate 'manifest necessity' for any mistrial declared over the objection of the defendant.");
United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824) (stating that a court may discharge a
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Government from using a manipulative mistrial request to avoid
the likely acquittal of a defendant,69 this rule protected the defendant's double jeopardy interests in avoiding repeat prosecutions and
in retaining the value of his initial fact :finder.1 0 At the same time, it
protected society's need to vindicate its criminal laws by allowing
the State to abort proceedings that suffer from irreparable procedural :flaws.71
The second rule was that, if a defendant himself successfully
moved for a mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause would not bar
the State from retrying the defendant.72 Like the manifest-necessity rule, this rule protected society's interest in one full and fair
opportunity to prove the defendant's guilt. That interest would
have suffered if every defendant whose mistrial request were
granted could have invoked a double jeopardy bar to retrial.73
Over time it became apparent that a gap existed in the two
traditional mistrial rules that prevented them from adequately serving the policies of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Combined, the
rules allowed and encouraged prosecutors to skirt the manifestnecessity test by engaging in prosecutorial misconduct designed to
compel a defendant to request a mistrial.74 For example, a prosecujury before a verdict has been rendered only if manifest necessity exists for doing so); see also
Poulin, supra note 18, at 635-36 {discussing the application of double jeopardy to retrials
after the granting of mistrials).
69. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
70. See supra section I.A.
71. For example, when an error in an indictment creates a jurisdictional defect that renders a conviction reversible on appeal, society's broad interest in the effective enforcement of
its laws outweighs the defendant's double jeopardy interests. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410
U.S. 458, 471 (1973).
72. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93 {1978) ("[A] motion [for mistrial] by the
defendant is deemed to be a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have
his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact."); United States v. Jorn, 400
U.S. 470, 485 {1971) ("[A] motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to
remove any barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant's motion is necessitated by
prosecutorial or judicial error."); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 467 {1964) ("If [the
defendant] had requested a mistrial on the basis of the judge's comments, there would be no
doubt that if he had been successful, the Government would not have been barred from
retrying him.").
73. See Jorn, 400 U.S. at 480 ("'[A] defendant's valued right to have his trial completed
by a particular tribunal must in some instances be subordinated to the public's interest in fair
trials designed to end in just judgments.'" (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689
{1949))).
74. The Court in Oregon v. Kennedy summarized the problem as follows:
[T]here would be great difficulty in applying [the traditional rules] where the prosecutor's actions giving rise to the motion for mistrial were done "in order to goad the [defendant] into requesting a mistrial." In such a case, the defendant's valued right to
complete his trial before the first jury would be a hollow shell if the inevitable motion
for mistrial were held to prevent a later invocation of the bar of double jeopardy in all
circumstances.
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v.
Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976)).
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tor who made a grievous tactical error at trial or who perceived that
an otherwise winnable case was going poorly might have made unwarranted and seriously prejudicial remarks in front of the jury.
The defendant, not wanting to risk conviction in the face of such
prejudice, likely would request a mistrial. If the judge declared a
mistrial, it would have been with the defendant's consent, and the
prosecutor could try a second time for a conviction in a new trial. If
not, the prosecutor would have increased greatly the probability of
conviction in the original trial· through his misconduct. By manipulating the mistrial rules, the prosecutor had all but eliminated the
double jeopardy protections to which the defendant was entitled.75
2. The Rationale of Oregon v. Kennedy
Oregon v. Kennedy76 recognized that such egregious
prosecutorial misconduct is fundamentally incompatible with the
policies underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause. Kennedy held that
double jeopardy bars retrial of a defendant when a prosecutor engages in misconduct with the intent of provoking a mistrial request
from a defendant and the prosecutor is successful in doing so.77
This rule prevents prosecutors from subverting a defend::µit's
double jeopardy interests by manipulating the mistrial rules to
avoid a probable acquittal while retaining the possibility of a subsequent conviction.78 At the same time, it does not discourage vigorous advocacy on the part of prosecutors, as only intentional - not
negligent - misconduct triggers the double jeopardy bar.79
75. As Justice Stevens explained, a defendant who is the victim of such misconduct faces
a no-win situation:
[T]he defendant's choice to continue the tainted proceeding or to abort the proceeding
and begin anew is inadequate to protect his double jeopardy interests. For, absent a bar
to reprosecution, the defendant would simply play into the prosecutor's hands by moving for a mistrial. The defendant's other option - to continue the tainted proceeding would be no option at all if, as we might expect given the prosecutor's intent, the
prosecutorial error has virtually guaranteed conviction.
Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., concurring).
76. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
77. See 456 U.S. at 679.
78. Justice Stevens described the underlying reasoning of the rule as follows:
The rationale for the exception to the general rule permitting retrial after a mistrial
declared with the defendant's consent is illustrated by the situation in which the prosecutor commits prejudicial error with the intent to provoke a mistrial.... There is no room
in the balance of competing interests for this type of manipulation of the mistrial device.
456 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted); see also supra notes 28-31 and
accompanying text. See generally LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 15, § 25.2(b) (discussing the
rationale behind and application of the Kennedy rule).
79. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 675-76 ("Prosecutorial conduct that might be viewed as
harassment or overreaching, even if sufficient to justify a mistrial on defendant's motion .•.
does not bar retrial absent intent on the part of the prosecutor to subvert the protections
afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause."); cf. United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1439
(6th Cir.1986) (noting, in holding that a prosecutor's aggressive closing arguments were fair,
that a prosecutor is permitted to strike "hard but fair blows"). Consider also the following
observation:
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Like other double jeopardy rules, the Kennedy rule attempts to
balance the competing interests of the defendant and society. A
defendant in a goaded-mistrial situation has a clear interest in
avoiding retrial and retaining the possibility of a favorable judgment from his initial tribunal: a prosecutor would be unlikely to
engage in the misconduct if he did not believe that the jury would
otherwise acquit the defendant and that the defendant could be
convicted in a new trial.80 In contrast, the State's interest in a full
and fair opportunity to convict the defendant does not suffer from a
retrial bar: the prosecutor cannot legitimately complain, after intentionally triggering a mistrial and thus aborting a fair proceeding,
that the State's interest has been prejudiced if retrial is prohibited.81
To give credence to that complaint would allow the State to take
advantage of its own deliberate abuse of process to secure the "proverbial 'second bite at the apple,' "82 a result that the Double Jeopardy Clause and Kennedy forbid.83

Because the American criminal justice system encourages vigorous advocacy, it is logical
to assume that every prosecutor's act is generally intended to prejudice the defendant
and obtain a conviction. The Kennedy decision holds that retrial of a defendant is not
precluded unless the prosecutor acted with specific intent to achieve an end beyond the
general intent to convict. Because the line between aggressive prosecution and harassment/overreaching is vague and nearly impossible to define, the Court feared that including overreaching in the retrial standard could serve to discourage aggressive
prosecution, a result not necessarily in society's best interest.
Cynthia C. Person, Note, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Double Jeopardy: Should States
Broaden Double Jeopardy Protection in Light of Oregon v. Kennedy? 37 WAYNE L. REV.
1699, 1706-07 (1991) (footnotes omitted}.
80. See supra note 75 and accompanying text; see also BBNNBTI L. GERSHAM,
PROSECUTORIAL MlscoNDucr § 11.S(b) (10th ed. 1995) ("[N]o prosecutor would intentionally seek to abort a trial when the chance of conviction was strong." (footnote omitted));
Westen & Drubel, supra note 27, at 94 (noting that the state might attempt to manipulate
mistrial rules "in order to shop for a more favorable trier of fact[ ] or to correct deficiencies
in its case").
81. The situation is contrary to that in Burks. See supra notes 43-55 and accompanying
text. Rather than being deprived of a single opportunity to convict by an error beyond his
control, the prosecutor essentially has forfeited that opportunity by using it to attempt to
subvert the defendant's double jeopardy interests. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("[W]hereas we tolerate some incidental infringement upon a defendant's
double jeopardy interests for the sake of society's interest in obtaining a verdict of guilt or
innocence, when the prosecutor seeks to obtain an advantage by intentionally subverting
double jeopardy interests, the balance invariably tips in favor of a bar to reprosecution."
(footnote omitted)); cf. Peter Westen, Away From Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of
Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 15 MICH. L. REv. 1214, 1255 (1977) ("[W]hile
forfeiture rests on a balance between the defendant's interest in asserting defenses and the
state's interest in cutting them off, waiver is thought to be based not on any such calculus of
competing interests but on a concept of free choice.").
82. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978).
83. Cf. West v. State, 451 A2d 1228, 1235-36 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) ("[I]n the Machiavellian situation where the prosecutor deliberately courts a mistrial .•. the normal sanctions
are self-evidently inadequate. A scheming prosecutor cannot be rewarded by being handed
the very thing toward which he connives.").
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III. PROTECTION FROM OPPRESSIVE REPROSECUTION
AFTER REVERSAL
As demonstrated in Part II, current double jeopardy jurisprudence does not provide clear guidance when a defendant's conviction is reversed because the prosecutor intentionally deceived the
defendant and the court by submitting tainted evidence at trial.84
Lockhart dealt only with the accidental introduction of inadmissible
evidence at trial and thus fails to address such a situation. Kennedy
is likewise inapposite because it addresses mistrials related to
prosecutorial misconduct rather than reversals. In the absence of a
standard to govern the gap between Lockhart and Kennedy, a defendant faces the unwelcome possibility of reprosecution in the face
of an initial failed attempt by the State to secure an unjust conviction at trial.
To prevent such a result, this Part argues that double jeopardy
should bar the retrial of a defendant whose conviction has been reversed due to intentional prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of tainted evidence when, absent the tainted evidence,
insufficient evidence would have remained to support the conviction at trial. Section III.A describes this standard and contends that
it finds substantial support in the Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence. Section III.B argues that the balance of double jeopardy
interests in cases in which section III.A's standard is met further
dictates that the Double Jeopardy Clause bar retrial in that limited
class of cases. Section III.C examines possible criticisms of section
ID.A's limited extension of double jeopardy protection.
A. A Standard for a Limited Extension of Double
Jeopardy Protection
An adequate standard for barring retrial should find support
within the Court's existing body of double jeopardy jurisprudence
and properly should balance competing double jeopardy interests.
Those objectives are accomplished best by a standard barring retrial
when two conditions are met: (1) the prosecutor intentionally introduced the tainted evidence at trial; and (2) excluding the tainted
84. For an example of such a situation, see the hypothetical case discussed supra in the
text accompanying note 1. Consider also the notorious false·testimony case of Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). Mooney involved a prosecutor's intentional suppression of
evidence and use of knowingly perjured testimony to obtain the conviction of a defendant for
first-degree murder. See 294 U.S. at 110. The defendant, who did not discover the tainted
nature of the evidence against him until after the trial had been completed, petitioned for
habeas corpus on the grounds that his conviction should be set aside. See 294 U.S. at 110.
Because the defendant's petition focused solely on his due process claim, however, the Court
failed to consider the implications of the prosecutor's actions for a retrial bar based on the
Double Jeopardy Clause. See 294 U.S. at 111-13; see also Ponsoldt, supra note 10, at 93 n.93
(discussing the Court's application of due process analysis to the Mooney line of misconduct
cases).
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evidence would have left insufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction at trial.
The principle of Kennedy provides firm support for this standard. In arriving at its intent standard, the Kennedy Court distinguished between misconduct that should be treated as akin to trial
error and misconduct that is so egregious that it implicates double
jeopardy concerns.85 On the former side falls misconduct committed with a general intent to prejudice a defendant, such as reckless
misbehavior, aggressive comments in a closing argument, and the
negligent introduction of inadmissible and prejudicial evidence, as
in Lockhart. 86 On the latter side falls the intentional misconduct
that the Lockhart Court failed to address - misconduct that deliberately destroys the value of the defendant's initial tribunal. 87 By
analogy to Kennedy, double jeopardy should bar retrial when such
misconduct succeeds in procuring a conviction that could not have
been procured otherwise.88
This standard also finds support in the rationale underlying
Burks. If a defendant could not have been convicted in the absence
of tainted evidence intentionally submitted by the prosecutor at
trial, the principle of Burks requires that courts place the defendant
in the position in which he would have been absent the misconduct
and thus that he receive the double jeopardy benefit of his deserved
acquittal from his initial tribunal.89 Had the court or the defense
85. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 675-76 {1982).
86. The Court stated:
Every act on the part of a rational prosecutor during a trial is designed to 'prejudice' the
defendant by placing before the judge or jury evidence leading to a finding of his guilt.
Given the complexity of the rules of evidence, it will be a rare trial of any complexity in
which some proffered evidence by the prosecutor or by the defendant's attorney will not
be found objectionable by the trial court.
456 U.S. at 674-75.
87. See supra notes 74-75; see also Poulin, supra note 18, at 648 ("[I]ntentional government (mis]conduct ... raises double jeopardy concerns because it manipulates the judicial
process in order to prevent the defendant from receiving a fair trial with the first factfinder. ").
88. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. In such a situation, the prosecutor has
achieved exactly what he set out to do: avoid the acquittal of a defendant that would have
occurred as the result of a fair process. As noted by the Second Circuit in United States v.
Wallach:

The prosecutor who acts with the intention of goading the defendant into making a mistrial motion presumably does so because he believes that completion of the trial will
likely result in an acquittal. That aspect of the Kennedy rationale suggests precluding
retrial where a prosecutor apprehends an acquittal and, instead of provoking a mistrial,
avoids the acquittal by an act of deliberate misconduct.
United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Ci~. 1992)
89. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit has long recognized
the logic of a limited extension of Burks to reversals of convictions tainted by prosecutorial
misconduct:
[T]he rationale of Burks [is not] inconsistent with application of the "prosecutorial overreaching" exception to bar retrial where the overreaching caused a tainted verdict to be
set aside, rather than a tainted proceeding to be aborted. Burks' holding, resting on a
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counsel simply discovered the misconduct at trial, the court would
have excluded the evidence, the conviction would have failed for
lack of evidentiary support, and double jeopardy would have prohibited the State from reprosecuting the defendant.90 Failure to apply the Burks rationale in such· a case thus has the anomalous result
of allowing a prosecutor to undermine both Burks and Kennedy
merely by concealing his misconduct throughout the trial.91 Protections so fundamental as those afforded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause should not turn on simply whether the Government's oppressive abuse of process is apprehended during or after a trial.92
Finally, application of the Burks rationale to reversals caused by
intentional prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of evidence
perceived dichotomy between reversals for trial error and reversals for evidentiary insufficiency, indicated that, as the fonner hold no implication for the guilt or innocence of
the defendant, they would raise no bar to further prosecution. . . . The extreme tactics
which constitute prosecutorial overreaching offend the double jeopardy clause at least in
part because they unfairly deprive the defendant of possible acquittal, by heightening, in
a manner condemned by law. the jury's perception of the defendant's guilt ....
Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298, 307-08 (5th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). Professor
Ponsoldt makes a similar observation:
In Burks v. United States, the Supreme Court unanimously held that categorical distinctions between appellate reversals and mistrials in the context of double jeopardy law
situations are not tenable. The Court's analysis supports the elimination of a distinction
between mistrial and appellate reversal cases involving judicial or prosecutorial overreaching, at least where the overreaching was obvious and intentional and ... affected
the defendant's fundamental rights ....
Ponsoldt, supra note 10, at 92 (citations omitted). But cf. Beringer v. Sheahan, 934 F.2d 110,
114 (7th Cir.) (stating that "a defendant who did not move for a mistrial on the basis of
intentional prosecutorial misconduct cannot invoke the double jeopardy clause to bar the
state from retrying him after his conviction is reversed on that ground"). cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1006 (1991).
90. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
91. In Wallach, the Second Circuit explained this difficulty while strongly approving of a
limited extension of double jeopardy to reversals triggered by prosecutorial misconduct:
[I]f Kennedy is not extended ... a prosecutor apprehending an acquittal encounters the
jeopardy bar to retrial when he engages in misconduct of sufficient visibility to precipitate a mistrial motion, but not when he fends off the anticipated acquittal by misconduct
of which the defendant is unaware until after the verdict There is no justification for
that distinction.
Wallach, 979 F.2d at 916; cf. United States v. Singer, 785 F.2d 228, 239 (8th Cir.) ("The defendant obtains mistrial only if the trial judge apprehends the sufficiently prejudicial misconduct In reversing, the appellate court simply corrects the trial court's error."), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 883 (1986).
92. As Professor Ponsoldt notes:
[I]n a case involving prosecutorial or judicial pverreaching, it should make no difference
that the determination of overreaching is made on appeal as opposed to during trial...•
If courts fail to bar retrial, regardless of the level of review at which prosecutorial overreaching is found, government conduct will go uncensured, the integrity of the judicial
process will be tainted, and the double jeopardy clause will be judicially undennined.
Ponsoldt, supra note 10, at 92 (citations omitted); see also Singer, 785 F.2d at 239 ("The right
of a criminal defendant not to be twice placed in jeopardy should not hang on which court
correctly determines that misconduct infected the trial."); Robinson, 686 F.2d at 307 (noting
the "strength of the criticism" that a defendant's double jeopardy protection could be affected "simply by the point in the judicial process at which a charge of overreaching is found
meritorious").
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is wholly consistent with the rationale of Lockhart. Lockhart rests
on the presumption that inadmissible evidence accidentally introduced at trial could have been replaced with other admissible evidence of equivalent value had the State simply been aware of the
nature of the evidentiary problem from the beginning.93 The same
presumption, however, does not apply to cases in which a prosecutor intentionally introduces tainted evidence at trial and deliberately deceives the court and the defense. The appropriate
presumption in such cases is that the prosecutor had no admissible
evidence of equivalent value to introduce at trial. A prosecutor
would not assume the serious risks of intentionally introducing
tainted evidence at trial if he possessed admissible evidence adequate to procure a conviction.94 The prosecutor's deliberate deceptions simply confess the actual weakness of his case. In such a
situation, the Lockhart presumption is no more applicable than it
was in Burks. Burks, of course, did not require a court to presume
that the prosecutor had on hand additional evidence at trial that
could have been used to remedy the insufficient evidence offered as
proof of the defendant's guilt.95
B.

The Justification for Extending Double Jeopardy Protection
In addition to finding support in double jeopardy precedent,
section III.A's standard adequately protects competing double
jeopardy interests by extending the double jeopardy bar to cases
that involve the most egregious and deplorable governmental
abuses of power. Intentional prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of evidence, like misconduct that manipulates mistrial rules,
triggers serious concerns of state oppression through abuse of the
criminal process. A prosecutor's intentional submission of tainted
evidence all but guarantees one of two results for a defendant.
First, the defendant faces a greatly increased risk of unjust conviction and punishment due to the prejudicial effect of the evidence on
the jury.96 Second, even if the prosecutor's misconduct is discovered, under Ball the defendant faces the onerous ordeal of a second
prosecution after his conviction is reversed. 97 The prosecutor undoubtedly hopes for the first result. But even if his misconduct
93. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text and infra note 102.
94. Cf. supra note 80 and accompanying text.
95. See United States v. Burks, 437 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1978).
96. Cf. supra note 75; GERSHAM, supra note 80, § 9.4(f) ("[K]nowing use of perjured
testimony .•• deprives the defendant of a fair trial ..•.").
97. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. It is well-accepted that due process
affords the defendant no remedy of a bar to retrial in such a situation:
[D]ue process analysis focuses on the impact of nondisclosed or perjured testimony on
the determination of factual guilt. A court finding a due process violation must overturn
the unconstitutional conviction. Such a finding, however, does not bar retrial for the
purpose of protecting the defendant from embarrassment, expense, and ordeal caused
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leads to a reversal, under current law he remains secure in the
knowledge that the State once again may put the defendant on trial
after having failed in its initial attempt to obtain an unfair
conviction.
Concerns of state oppression are even more grave when, absent
the tainted evidence, insufficient evidence would have existed at the
original trial to sustain the defendant's conviction. In that case the
balance of double jeopardy interests weighs heaviest in favor of the
defendant, and it is precisely in such a case that the test articulated
in section III.A dictates that the Double Jeopardy Clause should
bar retrial after reversal. Under existing doctrine, the defendant in
such a case faces a no-win situation similar to that of the defendant
in the mistrial context:98 he either must endure a second prosecution at the hands of the State or accept a conviction that could not
have been secured in the absence of the prosecutor's intentional
misconduct. But the State cannot legitimately claim that a second
prosecution is necessary to protect its own interest in effective enforcement of its criminal laws. The prosecutor has received the
complete benefit of one full and fair opportunity to prove the defendant's guilt. His decision to spend that opportunity deceiving
the defendant and the court does not entitle the State to a second
attempt at conviction; the trial was not .unfair to the prosecution.99
Retrial in this instance merely would reward a prosecutor who took
more than his share of the apple in the first place with a second
bite. To prevent such egregious abuses of state power from contravening both the policies and spirit of the Double Jeopardy Clause,
courts should apply this Note's standard to bar retrial in this limited
class of cases.100
by governmental misconduct. Due process only limits the right to retry a defendant
when there is a danger that the decision to reprosecute will be vindictive ....
Ponsoldt, supra note 10, at 92-93 n.93.
98. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanyin:: text.
99. For the same reason, the prosecutor cannot ameliorate the damage done to the defendant's interests by arguing that, because the state could have taken different action at trial
had the prosecutor's scheme failed, the jury would not necessarily have acquitted. See supra
notes 28-35 and accompanying text; see also Poulin, supra note 18, at 648 (concluding that,
when covert prosecutorial misconduct results in the reversal of a conviction, society's interest
in a full and fair opportunity to convict has been "fully served" by the trial).
100. It is difficult to understand how the Double Jeopardy Clause legitimately can be
seen as giving the state a "free shot" unfairly to convict the defendant. Cf. Ponsoldt, supra
note 10, at 89-90 ("[I]n order to protect defendants from abuses of government power, courts
should prohibit retrial in some cases [of appellate reversals of convictions]."); Poulin, supra
note 18, at 651-52 (noting that the government's use of deceptive tactics to avoid a feared
acquittal in the initial trial may trigger a double jeopardy bar to retrial and that there is a
need for "a principled and workable standard" to guide courts in determining when defendants who have been prejudiced due to governmental overreaching at trial should be
discharged).
The case of Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1992), provides a good analogy of
an instance in which a limited extension of the double jeopardy bar is necessary to preserve
the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. In Smith, the Pennsylvania
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This Note's test permits retrial, however, in the broader class of
cases in which double jeopardy interests are more balanced. For
example, retrial is permissible if, absent the tainted evidence, sufficient evidence would have remained at trial to support a defendant's conviction. A defendant in that instance has not been fully
deprived of the value of his initial tribunal; it is not clear that the
jury would have reached a different verdict in the absence of the
misconduct. Because the defendant is not clearly entitled to an acquittal, the State's vital interest in effective criminal punishment
should prevail in such a case. 101 This brings the case closer to the
sphere of Ball and Lockhart, as opposed to that of Kennedy and
Burks, making retrial permissible. Similarly, retrial is permissible
when a prosecutor does not intentionally submit the tainted evidence leading to a conviction. For example, a prosecutor might unintentionally submit a piece of evidence or elicit testimony that in
reality is false. 102 Presumably, the prosecutor could have addressed
the evidentiary problem had he known of it at trial. 103 This situaSupreme Court held that Pennsylvania's Double Jeopardy Clause protected defendants from
retrial after the reversal of a conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of
evidence. See 615 A.2d at 325. Based on circumstantial evidence, the defendant in Smith was
convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a woman and her two children. See 615
A.2d at 322. On appeal, the court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new
trial in light of the improper admission of a number of unreliable hearsay statements by the
trial judge. See 615 A.2d at 322. Some time later, the defendant discovered that the prosecution had withheld important exculpatory evidence and bargained with a key prosecution witness for false testimony against the defendant in return for favorable treatment on other
criminal charges that the witness was facing. See 615 A.2d at 322-23. Upon a motion for
discharge by the defendant after remand, the trial court found as fact that both instances of
misconduct were committed by the prosecution. See 615 A.2d at 323.
In light of the prosecutor's misconduct at trial, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court barred
further proceedings in the case and discharged the defendant after finding that his retrial was
prohibited by Pennsylvania's Double Jeopardy Clause. See 615 A.2d at 325. Finding that "it
would be hard to imagine more egregious prosecutorial tactics," the court concluded that
"the double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits retrial of a defendant
... when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial." 615 A.2d at 323, 325. In doing so, the court
recognized that the societal right to one fair opportunity to prove a defendant's guilt in some
instances may be forfeited by serious misconduct at trial. See Poulin, supra note 18, at 629
("Through its decision, the [Smithj court foreclosed any opportunity for the Commonwealth
to correct its errors and seek a new conviction in a trial untainted by error.").
101. For a useful comparison, see the discussion of Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982),
supra in note 52.
102. Lockhart v. Nelson provides a good illustration of such a case. In Lockhart,
"(u]nbeknowst to the prosecutor," evidence of a prior conviction submitted in support of the
claim that the defendant was a habitual criminal was false because the conviction had actually been pardoned by the state governor. See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 34-36 (1988).
Nor was defense counsel or the court aware that the conviction was void - as noted by the
Court, "it was mistakenly thought by all concerned that the conviction had not been
pardoned." 488 U.S. at 41 n.7. The Lockhart Court assumed that, had the fact of the pardon
been discovered at trial, the prosecutor easily could have corrected the error by submitting
evidence of another conviction. See Poulin, supra note 18, at 642; Collins, supra note 45, at
299.
103. See supra notes 28-33, 59-62 and accompanying text.
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tion is controlled by the trial-error rule of Ball and Lockhart as opposed to the standard proposed in this Note. Through no fault of
the prosecutor, the error deprives the State of a fair opportunity to
convict the defendant, and retrial is necessary to vindicate the
state's interests.104
C. Potential Criticisms of a Limited Extension of Double
Jeopardy Protection
There are three potential criticisms of this Note's limited extension of double jeopardy. First, critics might claim that language in
Burks precludes such an extension. Second, one might object that
Kennedy requires that the intent standard for an extension be more
specific than that proposed in section III.A. Finally, an extension
might be criticized on the ground that it raises insurmountable difficulties in practice. This section examines and responds to each
criticism.
An initial objection to an extension of double jeopardy to reversals of convictions tainted by intentional prosecutorial misconduct
is that such an extension is effectively precluded by language in
Burks. In distinguishing between reversals for trial errors and reversals for evidentiary insufficiency, the Burks Court noted that
"reversal for trial error ... is a determination that the defendant
has been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in
some fundamental respect, e.g., incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct. " 105
Based on this statement, critics of a double jeopardy extension
might argue that intentional prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of evidence should be treated like any other trial error,106
the appropriate remedy for which is the reversal of the defendant's
conviction followed by a retrial under the rule of Ball and Lockhart.
Both Kennedy and Lockhart contradict this reading of the language in Burks. Burks's language only prevents an extension of
double jeopardy if that language is read as being absolute, that is, if
it is read as applying to all instances of prosecutorial misconduct,
whether negligent or deliberate. In Lockhart and Kennedy, however, the Court explicitly recognized that deliberate prosecutorial
misconduct raises different concerns than negligent prosecutorial
misconduct or other procedural flaws that are akin to trial error.107
104. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
105. United States v. Burks, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (second emphasis added).
106. Cf. Mary J. Fahey, Note, Double Jeopardy: An Illusory Remedy for Governmental
Overreaching at Trial, 29 BUFF. L. RE.v. 759, 774-75 (1980) ("[A] defendant who wishes to
argue that if an appellate court finds that overreaching occurred which provoked his mistrial
motion, then a mistrial should have been granted and double jeopardy should prohibit his
retrial, will have to combat the dicta of Burks.").
107. See supra notes 63-65, 77-79 and accompanying text.
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In light of this distinction, Burks's language should not be under-

stood as referring to deliberate attempts by a prosecutor to deceive
the court. Rather, that language should be taken as referring to less
egregious instances of negligent prosecutorial misbehavior and
overreaching - such as unwarranted and prejudicial remarks in
front of the jury - that frequently lead to the reversals of defendants' convictions.10s
A second potential criticism of this Note's double jeopardy extension is that analogy to Kennedy requires a more specific intent
than is required under section III.A's two-pronged standard. Arguably, Kennedy extends double jeopardy protection only to "cases
in which the conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial. "109 This intent standard restricts itself to conduct intended to
manipulate double jeopardy rules for the purpose of initiating a second prosecution and does not encompass conduct that is merely intended to avoid an acquittal or secure an unfair conviction from the
jury. For an extension of double jeopardy to be consistent \vith this
reading of Kennedy, it is not enough that a prosecutor deliberately
submit tainted evidence at trial. Rather, Kennedy dictates that
double jeopardy bar retrial only if a prosecutor's intentional misconduct is aimed at triggering a reversal that would subject a defendant to a second prosecution.no Section III.A's standard does
not require such a showing of specific intent.
108. As Professor Poulin observes:
Generally, when a criminal case goes to trial, the prosecutor has some hope of obtaining
a conviction. The prosecutor's natural instinct is to zealously pursue a guilty verdict.
The number of criminal appeals pointing to prosecutorial improprieties reveals that
prosecutorial behavior that undermines the defendant's rights and risks an unfair trial is
a common occurrence in criminal trials.
Poulin, supra note 18, at 659 n.161; see also Evans v. Thompson, 881 F.2d 117, 123 n.1 (4th
Cir. 1989) (suggesting, based on the rationale of Kennedy, that the Double Jeopardy Clause
would bar retrial after reversal for trial error "if the error was the product of deliberate
prosecutorial misconduct").
109. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 677, 679 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Beringer v.
Sheahan, 934 F.2d 110 (7th Cir.) (limiting Kennedy's retrial bar to situations in which the
prosecutor specifically intended to provoke the mistrial request), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1006
(1991).
110. See, e.g., Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Proce·
dure, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1365, 1425-26 (1987) ("The [Kennedy] Court ruled that no matter
how egregious, a prosecutor's misbehavior at trial will not bar a subsequent retrial so long as
the prosecutor did not act with the specific intent to deprive the defendant of the protection
of the double jeopardy clause ...."). One commentator summarizes the Court's focus on
intent as follows:
The [Kennedy] Court ... viewed [the defendant's] prime interest as the right to have his
fate determined by the first tribunal. The Court pointed out that a deliberate sabotaging
of a trial, intended to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial, subverts that interest and must be protected by a bar against retrial. That interest, however, is distinguished from the defendant's right to a fair trial, free from error. This latter interest is
protected, not by the retrial bar, but by the availability of a mistrial or appellate reversal.
Where the defendant's right to a determination by the first tribunal is at issue, the
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This argument is flawed for at least two reasons. First, the
Kennedy test is not necessarily as narrow as critics may claim. Intent to trigger a mistrial, intent to avoid a fair acquittal, and intent
to secure an unfair conviction are merely specific instances of an
overriding intent to subvert the protections afforded by the Double
Jeopardy Clause by denying a defendant the benefit of his first tribunal. These states of mind are nearly indistinguishable in practice,111 and at least one court of appeals has included them all under
the Kennedy standard.112 Thus, this Note's test, though it may be
inconsistent with select language in Kennedy, is not necessarily inconsistent with the principle underlying Kennedy itself.
Second, even if the Kennedy test is as narrow as critics might
claim, no reason exists for applying the same narrow standard to
this Note's proposed extension of double jeopardy. The Kennedy
Court based its narrow intent standard largely on the worry that a
broader "overreaching" standard would greatly increase the
number of mistrial requests and subsequent double jeopardy claims
in trial courts as well as encourage trial judges to deny defendants'
Court's focus is not on the error itself, nor on the position of the defendant as a result of
the error. Rather, the Court focuses on the intent with which the error was committed.
Person, supra note 79, at 1706.
111. The objective circumstances that lead an observer to infer the existence of one of
these states of mind likely will lead to the same inference with respect to the others. For
instance, one observer rationally might conclude that oven and extremely egregious misconduct was intended to cause the jury to convict a defendant, while another observer might
conclude that such misconduct was intended to provoke a mistrial request. See, e.g., 3 Jo.
SEPH G. CooK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGIITS OF THE ACCUSED§ 23:32, at 361-62 (2d ed. 1986)
(discussing circumstances under which courts generally have found official misconduct to be
"accidental or unintended"); Fahey, supra note 106, at 771 (discussing the circumstances
under which a defendant has an "ideal claim" that a prosecutor intended to trigger a mistrial
through his misconduct). Compare Justice Marshall's statement in his dissent from the denial
of certiorari in Green v. United States:
Regardless of whether the Government's misbehavior was designed specifically to provoke a mistrial or was simply intended to reduce the chances of an acquittal, the net
effect on the defendant is the same: he is faced with the burdens and risks of a second
trial solely because the Government has deliberately undermined the integrity of the
first proceeding.
Green v. United States, 451 U.S. 929, 931 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112. In United States v. Pavloyianis, 996 F.2d 1467 (2d Cir. 1993), the Second Circuit
summarized the scope of Kennedy's intent standard as follows:
[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause protects a criminal defendant from multiple successive
prosecutions for the same offense that arise from prosecutorial overreaching engaged in
with the deliberate intent of depriving him of having his trial completed by a particular
tribunal or prejudicing the possibility of an acquittal that the prosecutor believed likely.
996 F.2d at 1473 (emphasis added). But compare the following statement of the court in
West v. State, 451 A.2d 1228 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982):
Ordinarily, when the prosecutor injects error into the trial, grievous as that may be, the
sanction is mistrial or reversal. It is only where the prosecutor deliberately subverts the
right of the defendant to stay with the original tribunal that the double jeopardy bar
becomes the appropriate relief. [Kennedy distinguished] not between grave error and
lesser error and not between intended error and unintended error, but rather between
deliberate error designed to accomplish Purpose A and deliberate error designed to accomplish purpose B •.•.
451 A.2d at 1234.
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mistrial requests. 113 That concern is unique to Kennedy's mistrial
context; no similar worry exists with respect to the intentional submission of tainted evidence when the remaining evidence would
have been inadequate to support a conviction. Unless the tainted
evidence is instrumental in securing a conviction,114 defendants will
have little incentive to raise claims of deliberate prosecutorial misconduct on appeal with an eye toward raising a subsequent double
jeopardy bar to retrial. For the same reason, appellate courts will
not face the specter of possible double jeopardy claims in every
case of reversal for prosecutorial misconduct. Consequently, the
pragmatic considerations that make a narrow test necessary in the
context of Kennedy - fear of incessant claims of "government
overreaching" - are inapplicable to this Note's standard.
A final objection to the extension of double jeopardy proposed
herein is that it creates serious difficulties in practice. Critics may
argue, for instance, that appellate courts cannot adequately discover and assess evidence of governmental intent in applying this
Note's standard.115 Similarly, it may be objected that the extension
will discourage vigorous advocacy on the part of prosecutors by
making them reluctant to submit evidence of questionable admissibility or to call witnesses of uncertain integrity at trial. Finally, one
may criticize an extension on the ground that courts will be extremely hesitant to make open findings of serious overreaching
against prosecutors and that such :findings may only serve to wound
the integrity of and undermine respect for the criminal justice
system.116
None of these problems is serious enough to defeat the extension of double jeopardy proposed in section III.A. Appellate
courts should have little difficulty applying this Note's intent standard - appellate judges are well-accustomed to inferring subjective intent from objective circumstances, and any possible
difficulties in proving and assessing governmental intent would be
113. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676 ("Knowing that the granting of the defendant's motion
for mistrial would all but inevitably bring with it an attempt to bar a second trial on grounds
of double jeopardy, the judge presiding over the first trial might well be more loath to grant a
defendant's motion for mistrial.") (rejecting broader overreaching standard for triggering
double jeopardy bar to retrial); see also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 15, § 25.2(b) (noting
two considerations influencing the Court in adopting the narrow test of Kennedy: first, that a
broader overreaching standard would "be at issue in virtually every case" and second, that "a
broader test would be counterproductive because it would influence the denial of mistrial
requests"); Fahey, supra note 106, at 772 (noting that the Court recognized that a broader
standard might cause appellate courts to refuse to find the necessary conditions for triggering
a double jeopardy bar for fear of that result becoming commonplace).
114. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
115. See Poulin, supra note 18, at 653 (discussing problems with intent-based tests).
116. Cf. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 483 n.1 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("[T]he relations between judges and prosecutors in many places may make judges reluctant
to find intentional manipulation.").
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no greater than those in other intent determinations.117 Moreover,
because the extension applies only to deliberate misconduct, it will
not discourage vigorous advocacy on the part of prosecutors.11s
Admittedly, a double jeopardy extension does require a willingness
by courts to make damaging :findings against prosecutors who engage in misconduct, but the possibility that a court will be reluctant
to make such :findings is insufficient to outweigh a defendant's interest in a fair trial, free of prosecutorial misconduct.119
CONCLUSION

To many observers, the modem American criminal justice system more closely resembles a laboring and overburdened machine
than a well-oiled instrument of state oppression. Ever-increasing
caseloads, decreasing budgets, and an emphasis on the rights of the
accused might cause some observers to dismiss fears of governmental abuse as unfounded.120 Nevertheless, governmental power remains awesome when selectively, employed, and the potential for
abuse in any given case is "virtually unlimited."121
As gatekeepers to such overwhelming power, prosecutors shoulder a massive responsibility. 122 Even the most well-meaning prose117. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 680 {Powell, J., concurring) (noting that a court can and
should "rely primarily upon the objective facts and circumstances of [a] particular case" in
determining whether the requisite intent exists). See generally GERSHAM, supra note 80,
§ 11.8(d)-(e) {discussing proof of prosecutorial intent under objective and subjective
standards).
118. For example, a prosecutor would have no disincentive to call a witness of questionable integrity for fear that, should the witness perjure himself on the stand, a reversal of the
defendant's conviction on that ground would bar retrial. In the absence of prosecutorial
intent that the witness perjure himself, the limited extension of double jeopardy proposed in
this Note would not apply.
119. Indeed, allowing a prosecutor's misconduct to go uncensured can have serious social
consequences quite apart from undermining a defendant's double jeopardy interests at trial:
Lawless enforcement of the law [by the] officials most definitely responsible for law
enforcement causes public disrespect for the entire legal process. When judges and prosecutors violate their sworn oaths, and engage in unethical conduct that deprives a defendant of a full and fair trial, the defendant is not the only victim - the jurors,
spectators, and the public become aware that the law can be violated with impunity in
the courtroom, by those sworn to protect and uphold it.
NATIONAL COMM. ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN
LAW ENFORCEMENT 268 {1931).
120. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 449, 505
(1977).
121. See id.
122. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 696 {1985) {Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The
prosecutor is by trade, if not necessity, a zealous advocate. . . . At the same time, as a representative of the state, he must place foremost in his hierarchy of interests the determination
of truth."); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1982) ("The
responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek
justice, not merely to convict."); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt.
{1992) ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an
advocate.").
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cutor can far overstep the bounds of justice in his zeal to further the
interests of the state in effective criminal punishment. When that
happens, the Double Jeopardy Clause should stand ready to work
as a shield for the accused and protect him from prosecutorial miscon1duct that so undermines fundamental tenets of justice as to implicate values enshrined in the Constitution. The Clause can hardly
fulfill this function as long as its implications for misconduct in the
context of reversals of convictions remain ill-understood and largely
unaddressed. This Note by no means settles all of the issues that
may confront a court as it applies the Double Jeopardy Clause to
reversals of convictions tainted by prosecutorial misconduct. It
does, however, establish an effective analytical framework to guide
a court in determining when prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of evidence implicates double jeopardy concerns. Still,
more than a theoretical understanding of double jeopardy is needed
to protect defendants from egregious prosecutorial misconduct.
Until courts bear the difficult burden of transforming theory into
practice, double jeopardy protection against one of the most condemnable state practices - the making of repeated, unfair attempts to visit criminal sanctions upon an individual - will remain
a largely illusory guarantee.123

123. See Fahey, supra note 106, at 761, 772 (noting the "general reluctance [of courts] to
prohibit retrial in cases of governmental overreaching" and the hesitancy to subject prosecutors and the judicial system as a whole to the severe consequences and criticism that attend
findings of misconduct and abuse); Eric Loeb et al., Project, Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1993-1994, 83 GEO.
L.J. 839, 1044 n.1488 (1995) ("The circuits are reluctant to find the intent necessary to satisfy
the Kennedy standard."); Poulin, supra note 18, at 646 (stating that no courts have extended
double jeopardy protection to cases reversed on appeal on grounds that would have implicated Kennedy at trial). Consider also the Court's observation in Green v. United States:
The right not to be placed in jeopardy more than once for the same offense is a vital
safeguard in our society, one that was dearly won and one that should continue to be
highly valued. If such great constitutional protections are given a narrow, grudging application they are deprived of much of their significance.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 198 (1957).

